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We investigate the consequences of allowing some players to send a costly mes-
satie beforc a Kame is playl!II. Slllce messagcs have no literal mcauing aending
costly messagea is also called `burning money'. We consider a setting with n play-
ers among which k have the possibility to burn money. We show that equilibria in
sete that are closed under rational behaviour yield all players that have the possi-
bility to burn, their preferred outcome. Moreover, in such equilibria uo mouey is
actually burnt, the possibility alone sufficea. For the special case with two playera
all results go through for persistent equilibria (Kalai and Samet (1984)) as well.
'CentER, Tilburg Univeraity P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands.
tThe author thanka Eric van Damme for many helpful comments.
:Thiw rest.arch was sponaored by the Foundation for the Promotion ofReaearch in Economic Sciences,
which ia part of the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Iteaearch (NWO).1
1 Introduction
Given a game in normal form, Ben-Porath and Dekel (1992) investigate the conaequences
of allowing some players to signal future actiona by incurring costs befoce the game is
played. They consider equilibria that survive repeated elimination of weakly dominated
strategies. 'I'heir main result is that, in a certain class of two person games, if only one
player can signal, then repeated elimination of weakly dominated strategies selects her
most preferred outcome. Moreover, the player does not have to incur any cost to achieve
this.
While this result is nice, it has some important limitations. First of all Ben-Porath
and Dekel consider only two player games. As we will show later by example, repeated
elimination of weakly dominated strategies need not work in games with more than two
players. Further~nore, they show that if both players have the opportunity to signal
(simultaneously), then signalling future actions is not possible, not even if the game has
common interests. Finally, they need that a player can burn a considerable amount of
money.
We considet a more general case. We extend n-person games by allowing k of the
players to signal future actions by incurring costs. [n order to obtain results símilar to
those of Ben-Porath and Dekel we work with a stronger solution concept. Van Damme
(1989) showed that stable eyuilibria do not necessarily lead to eflicient outcomes. We
show that, if the refined notion of curb or curb' (Basu and Weibull (1991)) equilibrium
is used, then signalling future actions is possible. Moreover, if there are two players then
the notion of prrsistence (Kalai and Samet (1984)) gives the same result.
'To be more precise, we get the following results in two person games:
- If only one player can signal, then, in the class of games considered by Ben-Porath and
Dekel, persistence, curb and curb~` select her most preferred outcome .
- If both players can signal, then persistence, curb and curb~` select the mutually preferred
outcome in common interest games.
In the general case with n players where k of them can send a message before the game
is played, we obtain similar results. Roughly speaking, if the players that can burn2
money have common interests in the underlying game, then curb and curb' select their
preferred outcome. Furthermore, in all models of pre-play communication, no costa are
actually incurred.
It may be worth noting that our result on the model of one-sided pre-play commu-
nication is not a cousequence of Ben-Porath and Dekel. They need that the player can
burn a considerable amount of money whereas we only need that the player can choose
to burn nothing or to burn a small amount.
In the next section we will consider a simple example oí a two person game where
only one player can signal. From this example the reader can develop some feeling for
the solution concept we employ. Moreover, this example shows a diffeterrce between our
approach and that of Ben-Porath and Dekel's. At the same time it shows that it is
iuipurtant Lhat iuos,:rgra :ui~ cosLly.
In section 3 the formal model and the notions of curb and curb' are defined. In
section 4 we prove Lhe theorern for these concepts for the general case. In section 5 we
consider the persistent equilibria in the special case of two person games. Moreover, it is
shown that in games with more than two players persistence need not work. In sectíon 6
we exarnine the conseyuences of analyzing the garne in the agent norrnal forrn instead of
the normal form. We close the paper with some concluding remarks.
2 An example: the battle of the sexes
Consider the battle of the sexes game represented by the following normal form. The
wuman (t,lie row playPr) prrG~rs to go to x soccrr match (`.S'), thc man (Lhe column







batt e l~he sexes.
Suppose the woman can serid one of two messages, ma or m~. Message mo is costless
and message m' costs c. Later we will consider the cases c- 0, c- 1 and c- 2. Let3
Tn'E denote the woman's strategy when she sends Tn' and visits event E. Let eoer denote
the man's strategy when he goes to event e; if he receives message m'. Then the game
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4-c,4 6-c,7 4-c,4 6-c,7
st t9 tt
ngure e.
First we will consider Ben-Porath and Dekel's approach. Conaider the case c- 2.
Action m'T is dominated (weakly) by moT. So the man should go to the soccer match
if he receives message m'. This means that st and tt are dominated. If the woman
knows that the man will play ss or ts, then the action moT is dorninated by mrS. So
t.he man kuuws that, 1.he wunian will gu I,o the succr~r niatch, hence he should go to the
soccer match also (st is dominated by ss). If the woman knows that, she will send mo
and go to the soccer rnatch (na'S is dorninated by moS). llence, repeated elimination
of weakly dominated strategies selects the outcome where both go to the soccer match
and no money is actually being burnt. Notice that this reasoning does not go through
if c- 0 or if c- 1. In these cases no player has a dominated strategy. For example, if
c- 1, mrT can only be dominated by a strategy that puts at least weight 6 on moT,
and at least weight 5 on muS.
We will look al, miuimal srts of strategies that are closed under best responses. (Basu
and Weibull (1991) call this curb: closed under rational behaviour.) A set of strategy
profiles is closed under best responses if with every strategy profile all its best replies are
contained iu the set.
Now look at our example. Suppose Rr x Rz is closed under best responses. It is easy
to check that we have the following implications (for all values of c under consideratíon).
m1T E Rr ~ tt E Rz ~ muT E Rr ~ ts E Rz ~ mTS E Rl
m'S' E Rr ~ ss E Rz ~ moS E Ri ~ st E Rz ~ moS E Rr4
In the cases with c~ 0 the set of strategy profiles where the woman plays moS and the
man mixes between ss and st is cloaed under beat reaponses. The aerie of implicationa
shows that this set is the unique minimal one.
If c- 0 the serie of implications continuea.
m".4 E It~ ~ ,9,9, st E R, ~ m'.S E R~ ~ ts E Rz
Since moT and m'T are best replies against ~st f zts, we conclude that the only set
that is closed under best responses is the set of all strategy profiles.
Hence, if talk is costless, then on the basis of curb no sharp predictions can be made.
3 The model
In this section we will formally set up the model of multi-sided pre-play communication
in n-person games. Before we do that we recall the notions of curb and curb` (Basu and
Weibull (1991)).
We denote the set of mixecí strategies of player i by E;. For a set o[ pure strategiea
X let co(X) denote the convex hull of this set, which is equivalent to the set of all
probability distributions over X. If o is a strategy profile then v-; denotes the profile
of all players besides player i. 'fhe set of best replies of player i against a-; is denoted
by BR;(o-;). Define BR(o) - jj-1 BR;(a-;). UBR(a) denotes the set of best replies
against o that are not weakly dominated. A retract is a cartesian product R- jj;~ R;
where R; C E; is non-empty, convex and compact.
Definition 1 .
A retmcl R is said to have the curb property if Jor aU o E R BR(o) C R.
A retmct is said to have the curb ~ property if for all o E R UBR(o') C R.
A retract which is minimal with respect to the curb (curb~`) property is called a curó
(curb~) rehnct.
A Nash equilibrium that is contained in a curb (curb'J retract is cal(ed a curb (curb~)
equilibrium.
These retracts are closely related and have some nice properties that are summatised
in the following lemma.5
Lemma 1. Every curb retract contains a curb" retract. Every curb' retract contains
a Nash equilibrium. Every curb (curb') retract is a cartesian product of convex hulls
of pure strategies. The intersection of two retracts with the curb (curb') property is
either empty or it has the curb (curb') property, hence different curb (curb') retracts
are disjoint.
Proof. Every curb retract has the curb' property and hence contains a curb` retract.
Suppose there exists an extreme point of a curb retract in which some player plays
a mixed strategy. If this mixed strategy were a best reply against some strategy in the
retract then all the pure strategies in its carrier would also be best replies, and hence
in the retract. Since this contradicts the mixed strategy being an extreme point, every
strategy that puts positive weight on this mixed strategy can be deleted from the retract.
This yields a strictly smaller retract that still has the curb property. For curb' retracts
the proof is similar.
Consider thc reduced game where every player is constrained to play strategies from
a curb' retract R. By the usual fixed point argument it can be shown that this reduced
game has a Nash equilibrium. From the definition of a curb' retract it follows that this
Nash eyuilibriurn for the reduced game is also a Nash eyuilibrium of the original game.
The proof of the other assertions is trivial. O
Let G-(S,, ..., 5,,, u,, ..., u„) be an n-person game with player set N. We split
up the set of players into C a.nd D. C is the set of players that can send a message
in the pre-play communication stage (communicating players); D is the set of players
that cannot (dumb players). Note that the players in D are dumb but not deaf. It is
important that they can hear. Wc assume that C, is not empty. D may bc empty.
Wc will assun~c
Assumption 1. There exists s' E 5' sucl: fhat u;(s') ~ u;(s), Jor nll i E C and all
s~ s' and such that u~(s') 1 u~(s`~,s~) jor all j E D and al! s~ ~ s~.
Notice that if C- N then C is a common interest game (Aumann and Sorin (1989)).
Assumption 1 says that the game has a strict Nash equilibrium that gives all communi-
cating players their highest payoff.
We assume that all communicating players dispose of the same set of inessages M-6
{mo,m',...,mL} and that the cost of sending message ma is c(m9) for all of them.
These assumptions are made for notational convenience only. They do not play a role
in the results we will derive. We assume that c(mo) - 0, c(m') ~ 0 is `small' and
c(mp) 1 c(m') for all p~ 1. In fact, c(m') is so small that
c(m') G u;(s') - u;(s) for all i E C and all s~ s' (3.1)
This implies that any communicating player that can induce the play of s' by sending
message m' will do so, unless sending mo induces thc play of s' also.
We denote the game with pre-play communicatiou by Pc(C) -( Tl, ..., 7;,, vr, .. . , v„).
T;-{m;f,~m;EMand f,:Mc`{;}-,S;} (iEC)
Ti - {fi~fi : Mc -~ ,S;} (j E D)
(We use the following convention if C-{i}: f; : M~ -. S; corresponds to a single
element of S;.) With some abuse of notation we have for mf E T- j-j~~ T~
v;(mf) - u~(Í(n~)) - c(m~) (i E C)
v~(mf) - u~(f(nt)) (j E D)
Remark: The way we have defined the strategy space here means that we are look-
ing at the reduced normal form (as Ben-Porath and Dekel did). In the normal form a
communicatinq player's strategy also depends on óis own message. It does not matter
for our resnltti whether we analyze the normal form or the rcduced norrnal form. Ilow-
ever, in t.hc nornial form Lhc r.onununicating playcrs have a lot of cyuivalenL strategies
and this makes the proof for persistence quite tedious. We could also luuk at the agent
uormal forn~ (Sclteu (1975)). Wc will do that in scctiun ~.
4 Results for the general case
In this section we will prove the theorem for the curb and curb` equilibria. We will deal
with the general case with n players among which the players in C can communicate.
Theorem 1 . Every equilibrium of Pc(G) that is contained in a curb or curb~` retract
yields pla~cr l u~(.K') (I E NJ.
Proof. We will denote a vect.or with all coordinates equal to mo by mu. (llepending on
whether this vector is in the domain of a dumb or of a communicating player, it has ~Cor ~C - I coordinates. No confusion will result.) Define
F-{m f E T~m - mo , f~(mo) - s~ for all I E N}
Notice that F consists of all pure strategy profiles that yield the payoff vector u(s`).
We will show that every curb' retract has a non-empty intersection with F. If this is
the case then every curb~` retract is contained in R- jj~-1 co(Fr), since R has the curb`
property. Since every curb retract contains a curb' retract we know then that every curb
retract has a non-empty intersection with R. Since R has the curb property itself any
curb retract is contained in R. I3ut then the theorem is proved since every equilibrium
that is contained in R yields player l ut(s').
Let R be a curb" retract and let rrcf E R` F. Now player I has a lot o[ undominated
best replies against (m f)-i. This is so because a player has a lot of freedom in how to
react on tuples of inessages that he does not receive. In particular we have
for all i E C there exists rn; j! E R; such that f;(m-;) - s; for all m-; ~ m-;
for a1l j E D there exists J~ E R~ such that f~(m) - s~ for all m~ m
If m'f' E F we are ready, because then F fl R~ 0.
So suppose m'j' ~ F.
Case 1: m. ~ mc. There exists i E C with m; ~ rno. All best replies for i against m'j'
involve sending m~. In particular, ii f,"(m) - s; for all m, then mof;' is an undominated
best reply and hence contained in R. Now for j E C, j ~ i all best replies against
(mof;',m'f';) involve sending mo. In particular, if f~ (m) - s~ for all m, then mof~' is
an undominated best reply and hence contained in R. Now it is shown that F fl R~ B.
Case 2: m- mo. Let i E C. All best replies for i against m'f' involve sending ml.
Hence, there exists mf E R with m~ mo. This brings us back to case 1. O
5 Further results for two player games
LeL us recall the notion of pf.rsistent eyuilibria (Kalai and Samet ( 1984)).8
Definition 2 .
A retract Il is called absarbing if there ezists an open neighbourhood U ~ R such that
for all o E U we have that BR(o) fl R~ 0.
An absorbing retmct is called persistent if it does not properly contain an absorbing
retmct.
An equilibrium that is contained in a persistent retract is called a persistent equiliórium.
For an elaborate discussion of the relation between persistent retracts and other so-
lution concepts the reader is referred to Balkenborg (1992). Two interesting facts on
persistent retracts we will state here, without proofs. Every curb~` retract contains a
persistent retract (Balkenborg (1992)) and every persistent retract contains a Nash equi-
librium (Kalai and Samet (1984)).
l,et us statc the following h,inma which will provc to bc uscfi~l in thc two player case.
Lemma 2. Let G- (S~, S~, u~, uz) be a game. Let F; C S; and H; - S; ` F;. Let
F- F~ x F~ be such that
(i) There are zl, zz E R such that
1. for all f E F u;(f)- x;
2. Forall f;EFj, h;EH;u;(h;,f;)Cx;
(ii) Every persistent retract has a non-empty intersection with F.
'1'hen every persistent retract is contained in R- co(h'~) x co(Fz).
Proof. Let R be a persistent retract, and let V~ x VZ ~ R be an open neighbourhood
that is absorbed by R. Define
m; - maxu;(s~,s2)
m~ - minu;(s~,s~)
b(h~) -;c~ - max u~(h~, f1) (h~ E H~ )
hEF~
b(hz) - zz - max u~(f~, hz) (h~ E H2) hEF,9
Notice that (i) implies ó(h;) ~ 0. Let b; - minti,EH, Á(h;). Let e~ ~ 0 (j - 3- i) satisfy
(I - c~)(r; - d;) f c~m; C(1 - c~)x; f c~na~ (5.2)
Lct o,(s,) denote the wcight that a; puts on s;. llefine V(c;) - {o; E V;~ ~h;Ey, o;(h;) e
e;}. Then Vr(er) x Vz(ez) is an open neighbourhood of R fl R. We claim that this
neighbourhood is absorbed by R fl R.
Lcl, oz E Vz(cz), hr E IIi, Jr E Fr. Now
ur(hr, oz) c~ oz(Íz)(xr - ê(hi )1 -f- ~ oz(hz)mi - Ft rr,
~(l - cz)(xr - ói) t Esmi
C (1 - Ez)xr f czm~
C ~QZ(Jz)xr f ~az(h2)ur(Jr,hz) - ur(Í~i,az)
F~ Ha
Hence, thcre are no best replies against strategies in Vz(cz) in Nr. k[ence, the best
replies are in F}. Reversing the. roles of the players then proves thc clainr. Hence, every
persistent retract is contained in R. O
Frorn now on we will assumc
Assumption 2 . No player has equivalent strategies in the game with pre-play commu-
nication.
Then we ha.ve that every persistent retract of this game is a cartesian product of convex
hulls of pure strategies. For a proof see Kalai and Samet (1984).
5.1 One-sided pre-play communication
First we will consider the case with one-sided pre-play communication, hence C-{1}.
Assnmpliun I is nuw cynivalenl, Lu saying Lhat t6~~ imdrrlying ganrc h.w, a stricl, Na,gh
eyuilibriurn yielding player 1 a higher payoff than any other strategy profile.
Theorem 2 . Isvery persislrnl cquílibríum oJ P{r}((:) yiclrls player l u;(s') (1 E N).
Proof. Let R be a persistent retract and let msr E Rl.
Case 1. rn~ mo. Then there exists g E Rz with g(mo) - sZ. This is so because all best
replies against (1 - e)ms~ t emos~ have this property. This implies that mosi E Rl, since10
it is the unique best reply against g.
Case 2. m- mo and sl ~ s~. Using the same trick as before we see that there exists
g E R2 with g(mr )- sz. If g(mo) - sz, then mos~ E Rr. If g(mo) ~ sZ, then mrs~ E Rr.
'I'his brings us back to case 1.
Ifeuce, m"s~ E Rr. It is easy to check that the set of extreme points of
F- {mos~} x co({g : M ~ Sz~g(mo) - sz})
satisfies assumptions (i) and (ii) of lemma 2.
Then it follows from lemma 2 that R C F. Notice that every equilibrium in F yields
player I ur(s') and the theorem has been proved. O
5.2 Two-sided pre-play communication
Now we turn our attrnl.ion to thc two-sided prc-play communication garne, i.e. C-
{ I,'l}. Itecall tliat assumption 1 now says that the underlying game has common inter-
ests.
Theorem 3 . Lsvc ry persisfral cyuilibr4um of P~(C) yields player l a payojj of ur(s').
Proof. Lct 1l bc a pcnistcnt rctract aud Ict mf E ll;. LeL j- 3- i.
Case 1. m~ mo. '1'hen tltere exists m'g E R~ with g(rrro) - s~. Hence, there exists
mof' E R; with f'(mo) - s;.
Case 2. m- rno and j(mo) ~ s~. Then there exists m'g E R~ with g(mr) - s~. If
g(mo) - s~, then there exists mof' E R; with f'(mo) - s;. If g(mo) ~ s~, then there
exists m~f" E R;. This brings us back to case 1.
Let F, - {mof ~f(nxo) - s'}. The two cases showed that F, (1 R; ~ 0. It is easy to
check that h', and 1~2 satisfy assumptions (i) and (ii) in Icrnma 2. Ilence, any persistent
retract is coutaiu~~d in co(!~'~) x co(!~z). Notice tliat any equilibrium in this set yields
player i u;(s') and the theorem has been proved. O
5.3 A three player counterexample
The following example shows that persistence need not work in games with more than
two players.11
Example. Lct re - 3,C -{3}. Player l chooses betwc.ru rows l~~ and Ir1i player'l
chooses between columns C, and C~ and player 3 chooses A. (Player 3 has only one









Now consider the following strategy profile: players 1 and 2 play their second strategy
aíter all messages and player 3 sends the costless message and then `chooses' A. Thia
yiclds the strictly dorninatcd payoff vector (1,1, 1). Nevertheless, this strategy profile
is a persistent retract as a singleton and hence a persistent equilibrium. In a small
neighbourhood of the retract player 3 has a unique best reply. Players 1 and 2 have a lot
of best replies against the retract, but in a small neighbourhood outside the retract they
have a uniyue best reply. This is due to the fact that players 1 and 2 have an interest in
choosing Lhe same action: in a small neighbourhood player 1 plays Rz with a very high
probability, after any message, and hence player 2 has to choose C2, after any message.
Repeated elimination of weakly dominated strategies does not work either. In thia
cxarnple thc mcssagcs are not irnportant to signal acl,ions, since player 3 has only one
action. But the messages help the other players to coordinate on the efficient outcome,
at Icast if thc: notion of curb or curb` is nsed.
6 Agent normal form
As remarked at the end of section 4 we have analyzed the pre-play communication game
in the reduced normal form. In this section we will look at the agent normal form (Selten
(1975)). The agent normal form is obtained by splitting every player into several agents,
one agent corresponds to one information set of that player and each agent having the
same utility function as that player. In the agent normal form different agents of the
same playcr take their decisions independently.
Consider [or example the one-sided pre-play communication game of the battle of the
sexes of section 2. The extensive Form of that game (when c- 2) is given in figure 4.iz
figure 4.
Player 1 has three information sets, namely 0, {mo} and {m'}. So in the agent normal
form there are three agents for player 1; call them lo, 1(mo) and 1(m'). Player 2 has
two information sets, namely {moS,moT} and {m'S,m'T}. Call the agents 2(mo) and
2(nx'). So the agent normal form of this game has 5 agents (or players).
It is well known by now thaL a lot of refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
rnay give different results in the normal form and in the agent normal form.
In the agent normal form of the game in figure 4 no agent has a weakly dominated
strategy. Hence, repeated elimination o( weakly dominated strategies does not work in
the agent normal form.
For persistence we have similar problems. Consider the strategy profile where agent
Ia sends mo, agents 1(mo) and 1(ml) play T and agents 2(ma) and 2(m') play t. One
can check that this profile is a persistent retract.
It is not surprising that persistence and repeated elimination of weakly dominated
strategies give different results in the agent normal form and in the normal form. By
splitting up the players into agents we have made a five player game out of a two player
gatne. We liave alrcady seeu that these solution concepts do not work in games with
more than two players.lu principle wc could have tho same }iroblems witli curb and curb'. In geueral it is
uot truc that the curb and curb` equilibria in the normal form correspond to those in
the agent normal form. However, the class of games considered in this paper is special.
We have
Theorem 4 . Every curó (curb') equilibrium oj the agent normal Jorm ojP~(G) yields
al! agents of player 1 u~(s') (1 E N).
Proof. For i E N let i(m) denote the agent of player i with information set {m}. For
i E C let io denote the agent of player i that sends a message. The number oí agents is
~C f(~N) x(~A1)~~. Let A be the set of agents. A strategy profile is denoted by
nzs. Let mv be the vector with ~C coordinates, all equal to mv.
Define
F- {rns~m - mv , s.tmof - s; for all i E N}
F consists of all pure strategy profiles that yield the payoff vector u(s').
Wc, will show t.hat every curb" retract has a non-empty intersection with F. If this
is the case then every curb' retract is contained in R- j]~Eq co(F~), since R has the
curb' property. Since every curb retract contains a curb~` retract we know then that
every curb retract has a non-empty intersection with R. Since R has the curb property
itself any curb retract is contained in R. But then the theorem is proved since every
equilibrium in R yields all agents of player t u~(s").
Let R be a curb' retract and let ms E R` F.
Case 1. m ~ rno.
For all aqcut.s i(m) with m~ rie we have that s~ is an nndominated best. reply against
ne.v. Ilcuce, ne.ti;(.,,ts-;t,;,l E If. An agcut iv with nt,o ~ nr~' lias a uniquc best reply
against this profile, namely to send mo. Hence, mom-;os;tmts';t,al E Il. Against this
stratcgy agent ju has a uniquc bcst reply, namcly to scud mv. Now it. is shown that
RnF~O.
Case 2. m - mo.
For all agents i(m) with m~ m we have that s~ is an undominated best reply against ms.
Hence, ms;tmis';tml E R. Every agent io has a uniyue best reply against this strategy,
namely to send mr. Hence, there is a strategy profile ms E R with m~ mo. This brings14
11~ ha('k tf1 ('atie Í. O
7 Conclusion
We have generalised the result of Ben-Porath and Dekel into two directions. We consider
games with more than two players, and there may be more than one player that has the
possibility to burn money. We have shown that curb and curb' retracts select the
eyuilibria that arc preferred by the people that have the possibility to burn money.
'I'his is in coutrasL with Lhe unintuitive resulL that Ben-Porath and Dekel obtained
in the case that both players can signal. In a two player game with common interests
repeated elimination of weakly dominated strategies selects the mutually preferred out-
come, if exactly one player can signal. It dces not matter which player can signal. But
if both can, t.hcn thc efficicucy resnlt disappears.
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